時間：2025年6月17日（周二）下午14:00-17:00
報告地點：主樓418
報告人：張成龍助理教授，香港中文大學（深圳）經(jīng)管學院
報告人簡介：
Chenglong Zhang is an Assistant Professor of Information Systems at The Chinese University of Hong Kong, Shenzhen. His research interests are in sharing economy, economics of information security, fairness and AI, and blockchain. His papers have been published in Management Science, Information Systems Research, and among others.
報告內(nèi)容簡介：Platforms in a sharing economy face suppliers who are heterogeneous in their service quality and their private opportunity cost. Moreover, consumers have heterogeneous valuations of the service offered by the suppliers. We investigate a platform’s optimal mechanism for matching suppliers with consumers in the sharing economy. The problem is challenging not only because of the multidimensional heterogeneity (i.e., consumer valuation, supplier quality, and supplier cost) and incomplete information (i.e., supplier cost), but also because a supplier can be matched with at most one consumer and vice versa and the platform’s value depends on who is matched with whom. We derive the optimal mechanism and characterize the optimal payment and matching rules. Our optimal mechanism extends the vast literature on mechanism design that has examined analogous issues in other contexts. We compare our optimal mechanism with the prevalent fixed-commission-rate scheme, in which the platform takes a fixed percentage of the price paid by the consumer as a commission, to illustrate the extent of gain the platform can achieve by adopting the optimal mechanism in place of fixed-commission-rate scheme.
（承辦：管理科學與物流系、科研與學術(shù)交流中心）
