題目：Losing target: Randomized environmental inspections and law enforcement efficiency
時(shí)間：2023年10月11日（星期三）14:00
地點(diǎn)：主樓601
報(bào)告人：張炳（南京大學(xué)教授、南京財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)副校長(zhǎng)）
報(bào)告內(nèi)容摘要：
Random inspection is considered a law enforcement method that can decrease the likelihood of collusion between supervisors and supervised objects. Using over 160,000 inspection records from 2016 to 2019, this study examined how China’s implementation of randomized environmental inspections affects law enforcement efficiency. We find that random inspections reduce the overall efficiency of law enforcement. Random inspections revealed 11% fewer environmental problems and 5% fewer environmental violations than non-random inspections. Further examination of the mechanisms reveals that the implementation of random inspections hinders the utilization of local officials' specialized knowledge in effectively targeting polluting companies and identifying violations, thereby diminishing the overall efficiency of law enforcement. To develop more effective enforcement strategies, policymakers should weigh the benefits of random inspections in reducing collusion against the drawbacks in losing target.
主講人簡(jiǎn)介：
張炳，南京財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)副校長(zhǎng)，畢業(yè)于南京大學(xué)環(huán)境學(xué)院，主要從事環(huán)境管理與政策分析、環(huán)境經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)的教學(xué)和研究，2013年獲得國(guó)家自然科學(xué)基金優(yōu)秀青年科學(xué)基金資助，2017年獲聘教育部長(zhǎng)江學(xué)者獎(jiǎng)勵(lì)學(xué)者計(jì)劃青年學(xué)者（經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)），2017獲得國(guó)家萬(wàn)人計(jì)劃青年拔尖人才。2018年獲得國(guó)家自然科學(xué)基金杰出青年科學(xué)基金資助。論文發(fā)表在Nature Sustainability、PNAS、QJE、AJPS、JPubE、JDE、JEEM、JPAM、JCE等雜志。參與我國(guó)排污許可證、排污交易、環(huán)境信息公開(kāi)等政策的制定，研究成果獲得環(huán)保部科技獎(jiǎng)一等獎(jiǎng)、二等獎(jiǎng)、張培剛發(fā)展經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)優(yōu)秀成果獎(jiǎng)等獎(jiǎng)勵(lì)。
（承辦：能源與環(huán)境政策研究中心、科研與學(xué)術(shù)交流中心）
