題目：Internal vs. External Control of Agency Cost of Debt: A Contracting View
主講人：Xian Sun 助理教授 （Johns Hopkins University）
時(shí)間：2017年6月8日(星期四)下午15:00-16:30
地點(diǎn)：主樓 216
主講人介紹：
Dr. Sun is an assistant professor in Finance at Carey Business School of Johns Hopkins University. After Dr. Sun received her PhD in finance from Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute in 2006, she worked for US Treasury, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, the supervisor of US national banks for 3 years where she was promoted to the position of senior Financial Economist. She has published in prestigious financial journals such as Journal of Financial Quantitative Analysis, Journal of Banking and Finance, Journal of International Money and Finance, and Journal of Corporate Finance. Her research interests include emerging markets, cross-border M&As, creditor rights and CEO compensation.
內(nèi)容介紹：
We model that shareholders choose between compensation contracts and debt covenants to address the agency cost of debt. Our model predicts a negative relationship between creditor friendly compensation (less CEO risk-shifting incentives) and covenant strictness, suggesting a trade-off effect between compensation and debt contracts. When the cost of debt contracting is sufficiently higher than that of compensation contracting, borrowers resort to less complex debt contracts, improve CEO incentives and the trade-off effect becomes stronger. Lastly, our model shows that such trade-off effect is particularly evident when information asymmetry is severe. We find empirical results to support our hypotheses.
（承辦：國(guó)際貿(mào)易與金融系，科研與學(xué)術(shù)交流中心）
